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JUDGES ARE ABUSING THEIR AUTHORITY TO 
DETERMINE OBVIOUSNESS BY APPLYING KSR 




Judges decide whether patents can withstand challenges of 
obviousness as a matter of law.1  For example, consider a patent that 
exists for a stool comprised of a seat with three legs.  A second patent 
exists for a table with four legs.  A third inventor then creates a stool that 
combining elements from the first two patents.  It contains a seat, similar 
to the first stool, but is built with four legs like the table.  If the new 
invention is challenged, a judge would decide as a matter of law whether 
the new invention is an “obvious” combination of the prior patents. 
This example illustrates the broad discretion judges retain when 
deciding what is obvious as a matter of law.  Part II of this Comment 
describes the statutory requirements to obtain a patent and how the 
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 
changed this area of law.  Part III discusses the lower courts’ application 
of KSR in recent cases.  Part IV examines problems encountered by the 
lower courts in applying KSR without changing the legal standard of 
review.  Finally, Part V concludes that, in light of KSR, judges have too 
much discretion when determining a patent’s validity. 
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES 
The Constitution gives Congress the right to grant patent monopolies 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”2  Before such a 
monopoly may be granted, however, an individual must show that his 
invention is “nonobvious” in order to obtain a patent.3  This precludes 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Timothy Armstrong, Matt Miller, and Megan Shuba for their guidance, and her 
family, Trevor Tersmette, Kevin Murphy, and Betty Murphy, for their support. 
 1. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This exclusive right was intended to induce inventors to 
publically disclose their invention through the patent system; however, the right was not to be freely 
given.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.  These monopolies were only to be given to inventions and discoveries 
that furthered human knowledge.  Id. 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
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the issuance of a patent for an invention that differs from prior 
inventions in only minor ways that are obvious at the time the new 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the subject matter pertains.4  The Supreme Court has set forth the 
framework for deciding whether an invention is obvious.5 
A. Statutory Provisions 
In order to obtain a patent, Congress has provided three 
requirements:6 the invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious.7  
Under the low threshold requirement of usefulness, an invention only 
needs to have some identifiable benefit.8  The novelty requirement 
prevents obtaining a patent if the invention was either known or used by 
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country, before the invention by the applicant.9  The 
third requirement of nonobviousness is the focus of this Comment.  If a 
pending patent is obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the specific 
field, meaning that it simply combines elements of prior inventions, then 
the pending patent will not be issued.10  Similarly, if an issued patent is 
subsequently found to have been obvious at the time it was invented, it 
can be invalidated.11 
B. Determining Obviousness 
The Supreme Court held that the obviousness of an invention is a 
question of law that must be determined by a judge.12  Lower courts 
created the Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation (TSM) test to guide this 
determination.13  Under the TSM test, an invention is deemed to be 
obvious if there is specific language in the prior inventions to teach, 
suggest, or motivate the combination of these inventions to form the new 
 4. Id. 
 5. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 744–45 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  This statute also describes the type of prior references that can be 
compared to an invention in order to determine if it is obvious.  OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 
122 F.3d 1396, 1402–03 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 10. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 13. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
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invention.14  The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the TSM 
approach in KSR.15  Instead, the Court broadened the obviousness 
analysis to include more rationales based on the common sense and 
intuition of a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.16 
1. Pre-KSR 
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court pronounced factual 
inquiries to serve as the basis for determining whether a patent is 
obvious.17  The Court had to determine whether an invention that 
combined old mechanical elements of a plow to better absorb shock 
while plowing rocky soil was obvious.18  The Court held that in making 
the obviousness determination, certain underlying factual inquiries were 
to be used, including the scope and content of the prior art, the 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art.19  Secondary considerations, such as 
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others, 
were also deemed relevant.20  After these inquiries were resolved, lower 
courts used the TSM test to determine obviousness as a matter of law.  
Under this test, mere evidence that the prior art contained the subject 
matter seeking to be patented or sought to solve the same problem was 
insufficient to decide whether an invention was obvious.21 
Considering the stool example discussed supra, the prior art 
references would be the two previously issued patents: the stool with a 
seat and three legs and the table with four legs.  Each element of the new 
invention, a stool with a seat and four legs, is captured in the prior art.  
Since the TSM test limits an inventor’s obviousness to the language 
contained in the prior art references, the stool with four legs would only 
be obvious if the previous three legged stool patent contained language 
that discussed the possibility of adding a fourth leg.  Additionally, if the 
stool with four legs was designed to solve the same problem that the 
table solved, it would not be obvious under the TSM test.  For example, 
the patented table might have been built with four legs to be sturdier; the 
 14. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 15. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. 
 16. Id. at 415–20. 
 17. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. at 17. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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mere fact that the stool added a fourth leg to be sturdier would not be 
considered obvious unless there was language in the table patent 
suggesting that this solution could apply to a stool.  Therefore, prior 
inventions that include every element of the new invention, without 
more, do not cause the new invention to be obvious under the TSM test. 
2. The KSR Standard 
In KSR, the Supreme Court determined that the TSM test was too 
rigid.22  In this case, KSR developed an adjustable gas pedal system in 
cars that allowed the pedal to be moved forward to accommodate 
persons with smaller statures.23  Teleflex, however, had already owned a 
patent for an adjustable pedal assembly.24  It contained a fixed pivot 
point where the pedal could be adjusted forward.  An electronic pedal 
position sensor was placed at the fixed pivot point to track the pedal 
position.25  However, there were three prior art references for Teleflex’s 
patent.26  The first reference taught an adjustable pedal assembly with a 
fixed pivot point for moving the pedal forward.  A second described 
using an electronic sensor to detect the position of the pedal.  A third 
reference taught to place a position sensor on a fixed pivot.27  After 
Teleflex brought claims against KSR for patent infringement, KSR 
argued that Teleflex’s patent was invalid because it would have been 
obvious based on the prior art references.28 
The Federal Circuit court reversed the district court using the TSM 
test to validate Teleflex’s patent.29  The court found that there was no 
specific motivation in the prior art to attach an electronic sensor to the 
fixed pivot point.30  On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Federal Circuit court holding that the TSM test was too rigid and 
formalistic.31 
The Supreme Court added rationales to be considered when 
determining obviousness.32  The Court first upheld the factual inquiry 
 22. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
 23. Id. at 407–13. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 415.  The district court granted summary judgment to KSR and found Teleflex’s patent 
invalid for obviousness.  Id. at 412. 
 30. Id. at 422. 
 31. Id. at 415. 
 32. Id. at 415–22. 
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framework provided by Graham.33  After these factual inquiries were 
resolved, the Court provided several methods of finding subject matter 
obvious as a matter of law.34  The Court found the TSM test 
applicable.35  However, the Court held that if a subject matter is not 
found to be obvious after applying the TSM test, additional rationales 
must be considered.36  Such rationales included combining prior art 
elements according to known methods, substituting one known element 
for another, using a known technique to improve similar art in the same 
way, applying a known technique to existing art that is ready for 
improvement, obvious to try among a finite number of identified 
solutions, and designing incentives or market forces prompting 
variations.37 
In applying these additional rationales, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily upon the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary 
skill in the relevant art.38  The Court determined that the obviousness 
analysis need not seek out precise teachings of the prior art, but should 
instead consider inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would employ.39  In trying to solve any given problem, 
the Court determined that a person of ordinary skill has good reason to 
pursue known options that are in his technical grasps.40  And, if this 
leads to success it is likely not because of innovation, but instead 
ordinary skill and common sense.41  The Court stated that when work is 
available in one field, design incentives or market forces can prompt a 
person of ordinary skill to implement a predictable version of an 
invention based in a different field or the same one, and that should bar 
patentability.42  Further, the Court established that, in many cases, a 
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit teachings of multiple patents 
together like pieces of a puzzle.43  Moreover, the Court also stated that 
rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to common sense are not 
consistent with case law.44 
Applying KSR, it might be obvious under common sense to design a 
 33. Id. at 413. 
 34. Id. at 415–22. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 418. 
 40. Id. at 417. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 420. 
 44. Id. 
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stool with a seat and four legs.  Indeed, a stool and table may not be in 
the same field of invention because a stool is for sitting and a table is for 
eating.  However, it may be within the common sense of a stool designer 
to look to other inventions with legs.  Thus, while the four legged stool 
would not have been obvious under the TSM test, it may have been 
obvious according to the KSR standards. 
III. CASES APPLYING THE KSR STANDARD 
The lower courts adopted the obviousness analysis provided in KSR to 
include the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary skill 
in the art.45  In Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited. 
Brands, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
held that using only the TSM test to find an invention not obvious was 
inconsistent with KSR.46  Because obviousness is a legal question based 
on underlying factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit provided that the 
standard of review allowed them to reverse the obviousness 
determination of the district court in Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp.47  
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in Hitachi 
Koki Co. v. Doll, resolved the question of obviousness by finding that 
the common sense of a person with a high technical background would 
cause him to combine multiple prior references.48 
A. Refining the TSM Test in Ball Aerosol 
In Ball Aerosol, two patents had previously been issued for candle 
holders.49  One patent described a candle holder with four legs that acted 
as a stand.50  The second patent described a removable cover on a candle 
holder that could be placed underneath it as a stand.51  Ball Aerosol 
combined these elements and obtained a patent for a candle holder that 
had a removable lid with four legs which could be placed under the 
candle to act as a stand.52  Ball Aerosol sued Limited Brands for patent 
 45. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 46. Id. at 993. 
 47. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 48. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp. 2d 4, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 49. Ball Aerosol, 555 F.3d at 988. 
 50. Id. at 991–92. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 987. 
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infringement when it sold a similar candle holder.53  Limited Brands 
counterclaimed that Ball Aerosol’s patent was obvious and invalid.54 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois validated Ball 
Aerosol’s patent using the TSM test.55  The district court noted that all 
of the elements claimed in Ball Aerosol’s patent were encompassed in 
the two prior art references.56  However, because there was not clear and 
convincing evidence of any motivation to combine the prior art 
teachings, the district court found that the patent was not obvious.57  The 
court stated that the defendant simply supplied prior art containing 
elements of the claims in the Ball Aerosol patent and, additionally, that 
the defendant used conclusory statements instead of an explanation of 
the motivation to combine the sources they had alleged.58  It found this 
use of the TSM test to be consistent with KSR because KSR stated that 
the analysis of a motivation to combine should be made explicit.59  The 
district court applied KSR to uphold the TSM test to find the patent 
nonobvious and granted summary judgment to Ball Aerosol.60 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and found Ball 
Aerosol’s patent invalid as obvious.61  First, the court applied the factual 
inquiries described in Graham.62  Under the first inquiry, the prior art 
was the two previously issued patents.63  Under the second, only minor 
differences existed between the two prior art references and the subject 
matter because the prior art described both a removable lid and a stand 
with four legs.64  Under the third inquiry, the technology of the candle 
holder was simple and easy to understand.65  As such, the level of 
ordinary skill in the art was that of an ordinary layman with average 
intelligence.  After these factual inquiries were resolved, the question of 
obviousness was to be determined as a matter of law.66 
Using KSR, the Federal Circuit found the patent obvious.67  It found 
 53. Id. at 988. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 987. 
 56. Id. at 988. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  Limited Brands argued that it was self-evident to combine the prior art references 
because they sought to solve the same problem of scorching caused by the candle holder.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 993. 
 60. Id. at 988. 
 61. Id. at 987. 
 62. Id. at 991–94. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 993. 
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that the combination of prior art elements was a predictable variation, 
grounded in common sense.68  The Federal Circuit determined the lid 
invention was obvious to try for the common purpose to minimize 
scorching.69  According to the court, the lower court erred by finding 
KSR to require an explicit motivation to combine.70  The Federal Circuit 
additionally held that the lower court failed to consider the Supreme 
Court’s intent to have a flexible test and to include the inferences and 
creative steps that an inventor would employ.71  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit used the common sense and intuition of a person with ordinary 
skill to invalidate the patent for obviousness.72  Summary judgment was 
accordingly granted to Limited Brands.73 
B. The Level of Review in Andersen 
Andersen obtained a patent for a reduced visibility insect screen.74  
The screen used a number of wires that were thinner and woven tightly 
together so that the window screen was more transparent.75  After Pella 
sold a similar reduced visibility insect screen, Andersen sued Pella for 
infringement.76  Pella counterclaimed that Andersen’s patent was invalid 
for obviousness.77  Pella asserted that the patent was obvious because of 
a mesh manufactured by TWP and a Japanese patent disclosing a 
method of coating a screen with light absorbing black color to reduce 
reflection.78 
The District Court for Minnesota first applied the Graham factual 
inquiries.79  It found that the defendants made out a prima facie showing 
of obviousness under these factors.80  The court asked, “[W]ould an 
insect screen manufacturer of ordinary skill have found it obvious to use 
the TWP screening material, decrease its reflectance value, bond it, and 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 994. 
 74. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 895. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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place it in a window frame?” and answered in the affirmative.81  The 
district court found that the heart of the claimed invention was the TWP 
mesh, which had been available on the internet and was in prior use.82  
Concluding that the use of mesh was a simple act of common sense 
rather than invention,83 the court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and found Andersen’s patent obvious and invalid.84 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.85  De novo review allows the court to draw its own legal 
inferences and conclusions while giving more deferential treatment to 
factual findings made in the court below.86  The court found that 
Andersen failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to two 
Graham factors—the differences between the prior art and the claimed 
invention and the level of skill in the art.87  However, the court found a 
genuine issue as to whether a person with ordinary skill in the art, 
someone who manufactures insect screens with no understanding of 
optics and physics, seeking to design an insect screen with reduced 
visibility would have looked to TWP mesh.88  The Federal Circuit 
agreed that both common sense and the nature of the problem to be 
solved could lead an insect designer to use a mesh material that was 
primarily used for a purpose other than insect screens.89  It found a 
genuine issue of material fact because the TWP website did not include 
TWP material on the insect screen webpage but on a separate High 
Transparency webpage.90  It also found that TWP, a company that 
manufactured insect screens, did not employ this particular mesh in any 
insect screen.91  The Federal Circuit determined that common sense 
might not have made it obvious to an insect screen designer to try using 
the mesh as an insect screen.  Because of this genuine issue of material 
fact as to obviousness, the Federal Circuit vacated the summary 
judgment in favor of Pella.92 
 81. Id. at 895–96. 
 82. Id. at 896. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 895. 
 85. Id. at 896.  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
 86. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 87. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 897. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 898. 
 92. Id. at 901. 
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C. Added Complexities in Hitachi 
Hitachi submitted a patent application for a desk-top saw.93  The saw 
was capable of being tilted to the left or right to cut at various angles.94  
It also allowed a work piece to be turned in different positions on the 
saw base.95  Hitachi’s patent was rejected by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) for being obvious based on five prior 
art references.96  The first reference was recognized by Hitachi in its 
patent application as Applicant’s Admitted Prior Art (AAPA).97  It was 
a desktop saw that could only be tilted in one direction.98  The second 
reference was a patent issued to Ito that described a desktop saw that 
could be tilted in both directions, but was connected differently to the 
motor.99  A patent issued to Johnson was a third reference that was not a 
desktop saw, but claimed a multiple angle cutting apparatus that was 
able to turn the work piece in different positions.100  Langworthy owned 
a patent describing a motorized surgical saw.101  Finally, the fifth prior 
art reference was a patent issued to Ambrosio that contained a motorized 
blade mounted underneath the cutting surface.102  Using KSR, the 
USPTO determined that one with ordinary skill in the art would have 
been capable of combining the prior art references to create the 
invention described by Hitachi.103 
The district court heard expert testimony during the bench trial when 
Hitachi brought suit requesting the court to reverse the USPTO’s 
decision.104  The first expert was Gary Katz, an expert in the field of 
finish carpentry, who testified that Hitachi’s design met a long-felt need 
among carpenters because it enabled them to tilt the saw to make cuts in 
both directions without having to manipulate the work piece.105  The 
second witness, Paul Hatch, was an expert in the field of power tool 
design.  He testified about the prior state of the art of desktop saws, the 
features of the Hitachi design, and the teachings of the prior art, and he 
 93. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 8–9. 
 96. Id. at 9–12. 
 97. Id. at 9–10. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 10. 
 100. Id. at 11. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 12. 
 103. Id. at 13–15. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
 105. Id. 
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concluded that no person with ordinary skill in the art would have a 
reason to combine those teachings.106  The defendant’s witness, Michael 
Gililland, was also an expert in power tool design.107  He rebutted 
Hitachi’s expert testimony by explaining that a person with ordinary 
skill in the art would have sufficient reason to combine the teachings of 
the prior art references.108 
Reviewing the USPTO’s decision de novo, the district court followed 
Graham’s factual inquiry framework.109  The court first determined that 
a person with ordinary skill in the art was either a mechanical engineer 
with at least five years of experience designing power tools, or someone 
with technical training and ten years of experience designing power 
tools.110  Second, the scope of the prior art was defined as references 
that encompass elements analogous to the claimed inventions.111  The 
court established that the five prior art references discussed supra were 
sufficiently analogous to the claims to constitute prior art because the 
content of the prior art was relevant specifically in what it fairly suggests 
to one of ordinary skill in the art.112  The court found disputes among the 
expert testimony as to whether the prior art described a base that allowed 
the work piece to be turned in either different positions or specific 
cutting angles while the saw assembly is tilted.113  The court relied on 
the defendant’s expert’s testimony to find that the prior art references 
taught all of the elements in Hitachi’s claim.114  Under the third inquiry, 
the court established the differences between the prior art and the claims 
at issue.115  It stated that although no reference, alone, taught the ability 
to make cuts by tilting the saw in both directions, it is not necessary for 
any single reference to anticipate every element.116  The court 
established that the prior art collectively taught every element of 
Hitachi’s claim, and therefore, there was little or no difference between 
the prior art and the claims at issue.117 
The court next sought to determine, as a matter of law, whether it 
would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 16–17. 
 110. Id. at 18. 
 111. Id. at 18–20. 
 112. Id. at 21–27. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 27. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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these references based upon the underlying factual inquiries.118  The 
court used KSR to provide that it need not seek out precise teachings 
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, but its 
analysis can consider the inferences and creative steps, or even routine 
steps, that an inventor would employ.119  Applying these principles, the 
court found that at the time the saw was invented, there was a 
recognized design need given the limitations of the AAPA and Ito 
inventions because neither reference could tilt forty-five degrees to cut 
in either direction.120  It found that there were a finite number of 
predictable solutions and that the saw assembly designs of Johnson, 
Ambrosio, and Langworthy were known options within the ordinarily 
skilled person’s technical grasp.121  The court found that the evidence, 
including prior art, indicated that the plaintiff’s design evolved through 
exercise of ordinary skill in the natural and expected development of the 
art, and while it may have solved a problem, it did so in an obvious 
way.122  Accordingly, the court concluded that Hitachi’s claim was 
obvious and unpatentable.123 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR affected lower courts’ analyses 
for determining whether an invention is obvious.  Applying these effects 
to the obviousness analysis has caused problems for the lower courts.  
The problems arising from the altered obviousness analysis can be 
distinguished from the claim construction area of patent law, where a 
similar analysis was not considered to contain problems.  A solution is 
possible to improve the obviousness analysis used by the courts. 
A. The Effects of KSR in the Lower Courts’ Obviousness Analysis 
The lower courts have concluded that the KSR decision broadened the 
analysis for finding obviousness.  However, the courts have continued to 
use the same legal standard of review when the decision for obviousness 
is appealed. 
 118. Id. at 28. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 28–29. 
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1. The Shift to a Broader Obviousness Analysis 
Although the lower courts were initially uncertain whether KSR 
affected their analysis of obviousness, courts have properly adopted 
using common sense and the intuition of a person with ordinary skill in 
the art in their analysis.124  Because the district court in Ball Aerosol 
found that its analysis could remain unchanged by KSR, the court 
continued to rely on an unaltered TSM test that limited it to language in 
the prior art. 125  The Federal Circuit, however, found this analysis to be 
the same rigid application that the Supreme Court had previously 
rejected.126  The TSM test is now a starting point, and courts have 
properly applied KSR to include more rationales that consider the 
circumstances in each case.127  This requires the court to go beyond the 
language of the prior art references.  As illustrated in Ball Aerosol, this 
enlarged standard has found patents that were valid under the TSM test 
to be invalid.128  Because patents are drafted to ultimately enable a 
person with ordinary skill in the art to use the invention, the obviousness 
analysis has been improved to include this person’s viewpoint in 
determining whether a patentee has sufficiently contributed to the 
progress of the field.129  Lower courts have appropriately adopted the 
broadened obviousness analysis. 
2. The Courts Did Not Change the Legal Standard of Review 
Although the procedure to analyze obviousness expanded to include 
common sense, lower courts did not change the legal standard of de 
novo review in the wake of KSR.130  The legal standard of review for 
obviousness is a question of law consisting of underlying factual 
inquiries.131  Obviousness is reviewed de novo at each level of appeal.132  
In Andersen, the analysis began with the Graham factual inquiries, 
which are given more deferential treatment on review.133  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit did not alter the district court’s determinations 
 124. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 993. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 130. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413 (2007). 
 131. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 132. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009); Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 16 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 133. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 895. 
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concerning the factual inquiries.134  However, reviewing courts are free 
to set aside the legal decisions of obviousness made below.135  The 
Federal Circuit used the district court’s factual answers to make different 
inferences and legal conclusions that the invention was not obvious.136  
It easily reversed the legal conclusion that a person using common sense 
would not use mesh.137  Because obviousness determinations are 
questions of law, the court had the relatively unimpeded authority to 
reverse.  This demonstrates the level of de novo review that the 
reviewing court continues to exercise after the adoption of a broader 
analysis. 
B. Problems Created in the Lower Courts from Applying KSR 
Unlike the TSM test, the broader obviousness analysis that includes 
the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary skill in the art 
is difficult to apply without changing the standard of review.  Also, a 
judge deciding obviousness as a matter of law probably does not possess 
the background knowledge of common sense of a person with ordinary 
skill in the art in each circumstance. 
1. Difficulty in Applying the Adopted KSR Standard 
The previous method to determine an invention’s obviousness, the 
TSM test, was well-defined and objective.138  Lower courts only had to 
interpret the prior references to detect any teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine or change the invention.139  Such teaching in the 
prior art would then render obvious an invention that made that 
combination or change.140  As the district court illustrated in Ball 
Aerosol, it found every element of the claimed candle holder in the prior 
art.  However, these documents contained no teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine the lid with the legs.141  Therefore, Ball 
Aerosol’s patent of a candle holder with a lid and legs was not 
considered to be obvious under the TSM method.142  This approach is 
 134. Id. at 897.  The Federal Circuit used the answers to the factual inquiries from the district 
court to make different inferences and found a material issue of fact. 
 135. Hitachi, 620 F. Supp.2d at 16. 
 136. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 897. 
 137. Id. at 900. 
 138. See Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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well defined to only the language in the prior references.  It is also an 
objective test because it limits using human intuition to interpret the 
prior reference 143
Lower courts do not have the benefit of a well-defined test under the 
altered obviousness analysis.  The inclusion of additional rationales left 
courts with the difficult task of determining how to define and apply 
common sense.  The Supreme Court in KSR provided no guidance on 
how to apply this standard.144  This lack of guidance resulted in arbitrary 
application and inconsistent conclusions.  In Andersen, the decision 
hinged on whether common sense would cause a person with ordinary 
skill in designing insect screens to use a TWP mesh material.145  The 
district court answered this question affirmatively because the material 
had been available on the internet.146  The Federal Circuit, however, 
reversed this determination because the internet site neither categorized 
the material under its insect screen information nor used the material in 
its own insect screens.147  Both courts used the concept of common 
sense.  This, however, illustrates that finding the level of common sense 
in the field has not been well-defined and has caused inconsistent 
results. 
The addition of common sense and intuition of a skilled person in the 
art into the obviousness analysis also caused it to be more subjective.148  
Instead of merely relying on documents, lower courts must attempt now 
to analyze the reasoning of a hypothetical person in the specific art.  
This requires taking the facts and circumstances of each case into 
account.  As illustrated in Andersen, courts were examining the mindset 
of an insect screen designer.149  The consideration of human reasoning 
also leads to inconsistent results because it is difficult to read the mind 
of a person with ordinary skill in the art and make conclusions based on 
such a reading.150  Lower courts have used the KSR standard to account 
for human decisions that cause the obviousness analysis to be more 
subjective and inconsistent. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 145. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 898. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 896. 
 150. Id. at 900. 
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2. A Judge May Not Possess the Ordinary Technical Background 
Because the Supreme Court changed the obviousness analysis without 
changing the legal standard of review, lower court judges are confronted 
with establishing and applying the level of common sense of a person 
with ordinary skill in the art as a matter of law.151  Under the TSM test, 
lower court judges only had to interpret the documents to find an explicit 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation.152  KSR, however, forced judges to 
put themselves in the shoes of a person with ordinary skill in the art to 
decide if a combination or change in inventions was an obvious step 
because of common sense.153 
An obviousness determination is based on the level of ordinary skill 
in the pertinent art, which may be very technical and outside a judge’s 
knowledge.  In Hitachi, such an ordinary level of skill was either a 
degree in mechanical engineering plus five years of experience 
designing power tools or someone with technical training plus ten years 
of experience designing power tools.154  It is unlikely that a judge 
possesses this level of experience.  Determining obviousness becomes a 
complex task because it is difficult to ascertain why a person made an 
inventive decision without this type of technical training or 
understanding.155  Lower court judges are challenged by having to detect 
and apply the level of common sense a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would possess without having the required background knowledge. 
Some cases are also complicated by deciding whether the 
combination of multiple patents would be obvious based on the common 
sense of a person with ordinary skill in the art.156  KSR stated that it may 
be common sense to fit multiple references together like pieces of a 
puzzle.157  The opinion also included the combination of prior art 
references of different fields.158  In Hitachi, the district court combined 
five prior art references to find that the desktop saw was obvious as 
common sense.159  These included references ranging from similar 
desktop saws to handheld and medical devices.160  The judge decided as 
 151. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007). 
 152. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 988 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 153. Id. at 993. 
 154. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d. 4, 18 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 155. Id. at 21–27. 
 156. Id. at 9–12. 
 157. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Hitachi, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29. 
 160. Id. at 9–12. 
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a matter of law that it would be obvious to an experienced power tool 
designer to combine all of these references.161  Lower courts have 
applied KSR to allow judges, who do not have a technical background, 
to decide that combining many prior references in various fields will 
render an invention obvious. 
C. Distinguishing the Obvious Analysis from Claim Construction 
Claim construction is an area of patent law that construes the 
description of an invention and the specification of claims, the portion of 
the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights.162  
The Supreme Court determined that interpreting documents in claim 
construction is a matter entirely for the court, which was consistent with 
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.163  The Federal Circuit 
further held that judges should rely more on intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic evidence when interpreting claims.164  The Supreme Court also 
provided judges with the authority to resolve expert testimony.165  The 
Federal Circuit found that this decision placed claim construction under 
its authority because it could freely reverse the decision of law on 
appeal.166  This provided uniformity in claim construction decisions.167  
The determination of obviousness, however, differs from claim 
construction, and judges who follow these rules in their obviousness 
analysis abuse their discretion. 
1. The Judges’ Role in Interpreting Documents 
Claim construction provided judges with the authority to interpret 
patent documents entirely as a matter of law.168  The Seventh 
Amendment provides that for suits at common law, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved.169  The Supreme Court found that at the time the 
Seventh Amendment was adopted, judges ordinarily construed written 
documents, and a jury was left with the task of finding facts.170  
Therefore, judges had the responsibility of construing patent documents 
 161. Id. at 28–29. 
 162. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 165. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90. 
 166. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 167. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 376. 
 170. Id. at 383. 
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to define terms in the written claims. 
The obviousness analysis under the TSM test was consistent with the 
theory of claim construction that interpreting documents should be 
accomplished as a matter of law.  The TSM test only required the 
interpretation of prior references to find a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine or alter elements of an invention.171  This test 
was similar to claim construction because claim construction also only 
interpreted the patent document to determine the meanings of the terms 
used.  Thus, the TSM test did not infringe on the preservation of a right 
to a trial by jury. 
After KSR, lower courts determine whether an invention is obvious, 
judges are overstepping their authority of interpreting documents as a 
matter of law provided in claim construction.  Instead of merely 
interpreting documents to find an invention obvious, lower courts 
concluded that KSR broadened the legal obviousness standard.172  In 
Andersen, judges focused on whether a skilled person would have 
decided under common sense to use a mesh material for insect 
screens.173  Andersen thus analyzes reasoning, which goes beyond 
interpreting documents.  Because the determination of obviousness 
requires more than interpreting documents, judges have overstepped 
their authority provided in the area of claim construction to conclude an 
invention is obvious as a matter of law. 
2. Instrinsic Versus Extrinsic Evidence 
The Federal Circuit determined that claim construction should rely 
mainly on intrinsic evidence to interpret the meanings of terms.174  It 
found that a judge should interpret terms in the claims of a patent 
document by observing how the terms are used intrinsically in the rest of 
the patent document rather than relying on dictionary meanings or other 
experts in the field.175  Such extrinsic sources are too generic by 
reflecting an interpretation of a term under a common usage.  They do 
not properly reflect the intention of the patent drafter to use terms in a 
certain way in order to limit the scope of his invention.176  The court 
 171. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 172. Id. at 993. 
 173. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 174. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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held that interpreting claim terms based upon how they are used in the 
patent document is more helpful in determining how the drafter intended 
to define the invention.177  Therefore, intrinsic evidence is used more in 
the area of claim construction. 
Unlike claim construction, however, the determination of obviousness 
will require more use of extrinsic evidence.  The broader obviousness 
analysis requires judges to go beyond the patent document to discover 
the level of common sense in the field from the viewpoint of a person 
with ordinary skills.178  This requires examining knowledge in an entire 
field, not just within the patent document itself.  Also, because judges do 
not possess the specific technical background, they will be forced to 
look beyond the patent document to learn about the technologies.  The 
best method to accomplish this is to use expert testimony.  As illustrated 
in Hitachi, the judge relied heavily on expert testimony to determine that 
a desktop saw invention would have been obvious as according to the 
common sense of a person with ordinary skill.179  Hitachi thus 
demonstrates the frequent need for using expert witnesses as extrinsic 
evidence to provide information about common training and knowledge 
within the pertinent field, which a judge does not possess.  Therefore, 
when determining obviousness, judges will use more extrinsic evidence 
than in claim construction. 
3. Resolving Expert Testimony by the District Courts 
Claim construction was deemed to be a purely legal question, which 
caused the Supreme Court to provide the authority for judges to resolve 
both legal and factual issues.180  The Court found that when an issue 
falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical 
fact, one judicial actor is better positioned to decide the issue in 
question.181  The Court held that judges, not juries, are better suited to 
find the acquired meaning of patent terms, thus giving judges the 
authority to make factual determinations when interpreting patent 
documents.182  These factual determinations included allowing the judge 
to resolve expert testimony.183  Although making credibility 
determinations is the jury’s forte, the Supreme Court found that this 
 177. Id. 
 178. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 896. 
 179. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 21–27 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 180. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 389–90. 
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would rarely occur in claim construction because the testimony would 
be used in an educational context.184  The Court, consequently, provided 
the authority for judges to resolve expert testimony in the area of claim 
construction. 
Because the question of obviousness relies on underlying factual 
inquiries, judges should not be able to make any factual inquiries.  As 
demonstrated in Andersen, the Graham factors began the obviousness 
analysis.185  When these facts are contested by the parties, a jury is 
already involved in the process of deciding obviousness.186  Because 
two judicial actors are involved, juries should retain their fact-finding 
role under the Seventh Amendment of finding facts.  Therefore, judges 
determining obviousness should not be making any factual inquiries. 
The regular use of expert testimony by both parties in a suit, unlike in 
claim construction, requires judges to frequently make factual 
determinations about credibility that infringe on jury rights provided by 
the Seventh Amendment.  Plaintiffs and defendants will probably 
present expert testimony representing their respective viewpoints about 
common sense in the field.  This testimony will probably be skewed to 
the side that they represent and will, therefore, conflict.  In Hitachi, the 
plaintiff and defendant both presented expert testimony with respect to 
obviousness.187  While the plaintiff provided two witnesses to prove that 
the desktop saw was not obvious.  The defendant presented conflicting 
testimony that the desktop saw was obvious.188  Because obviousness is 
a question of law, the judge resolved the testimony.  This shows that the 
expert testimony was presented not only to educate a judge on how a 
term was used but also to persuade the judge about each party’s 
respective viewpoint of common sense in the field.  However, the 
Seventh Amendment provides that a jury has the traditional role of 
resolving expert testimony because it has the ability to evaluate 
demeanor and sense the mainsprings of human conduct.189  Judges 
resolving expert testimony that is offered to advocate for a party 
infringes the Seventh Amendment and oversteps the authority provided 
in claim construction. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 186. Id. at 900.  The Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment granted by the district court 
because it found a material issue of fact that a jury should determine.  Id. 
 187. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90. 
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4. Resolving Expert Testimony by the Federal Circuit 
Because interpreting patent claims was a purely legal issue, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that such interpretations are subject to de novo 
review on appeal.190  The court did not detect any intent in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion that claim construction involved any underlying 
questions of fact but instead that it was purely a legal issue.191  This de 
novo review included any allegedly fact-based questions relating to 
claim construction, including determinations about expert testimony.192  
This is appropriate because the reviewing court is able to review the 
document being interpreted.  Under de novo review, the Federal Circuit 
is permitted to set aside the entire decision of the lower court in the area 
of claim construction, including determinations about expert 
testimony.193 
The determination of whether an invention is obvious is also a legal 
question that is subject to de novo review, but the reviewing court would 
violate the authority allowed in claim construction if it made its own 
determinations about expert testimony.  The broader obviousness 
analysis includes factual inquiries that are given more deferential 
treatment under de novo review.194  This leaves the determination of 
obviousness as both a trial court and appellate court decision on appeal.  
If the Federal Circuit were allowed to set aside a lower court’s factual 
determinations about expert testimony, then the appropriate deferential 
treatment would not be afforded.  By including the resolution of expert 
testimony as a small factual determination allowed by the judge as in 
claim construction, the obviousness determination would not only 
infringe on jury rights but also on the required deferential treatment of 
the lower court’s findings. 
Another reason the Federal Circuit should not be making 
determinations about expert testimony relates to the fact that it is 
removed from observing the testimony.  The broader obviousness 
analysis heavily relies upon expert testimony to determine the ordinary 
level of common sense in the field, which causes the determination to 
extend beyond patent documents.195  Instead of relying on the 
documents themselves, Federal Circuit judges would be making 
credibility determinations even though they did not witness the 
 190. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 191. Id. at 1455–56. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 16 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 195. Id. at 15. 
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testimony first hand.  The ability to observe expert testimony is a 
substantial element in determining credibility because one can observe 
human behavior and make certain inferences.  Because the Federal 
Circuit is removed from witnessing expert testimony, it should not be 
permitted to make its own credibility determinations as a matter of law. 
5. Uniformity 
Because of the inclusion of the underlying circumstances in each 
case, the obviousness analysis cannot be as uniform as the purely legal 
matter of claim construction.  Judges are permitted to make factual 
findings in claim construction to provide uniformity across jurisdictions.  
This is because judges are bound by stare decisis.196  However, 
obviousness  relies on the facts and circumstances of each invention and 
the knowledge within any given field.197  Even if the legal standard is 
uniform, the application of common sense and intuition of a person with 
ordinary skill itself leads to inconsistent results.198  As in Andersen, 
judges were deciding the ability of common sense of a person with 
ordinary skill.199  Even within the same case, the judges came to 
different results.200  The reliance on expert testimony also makes it less 
uniform.  It is uncertain which side is more credible.  Thus, uniformity is 
less likely in the area of obviousness than in the area of claim 
construction, so judges should be precluded from making factual 
findings. 
V. A SOLUTION 
Obviousness should remain a legal question with underlying factual 
inquiries.  However, to improve the obviousness analysis, the 
determination of the level of common sense of a person with ordinary 
skill in the art should be added to the underlying factual inquiries.  
Because factual inquiries already exist, such an addition will not be a 
burdensome transition.  This shift will solve some of the problems 
discussed supra and will change the outcome of some cases. 
 196. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 197. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 198. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2739 (2009). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 900.  The district court thought it was common sense to use TWP mesh, while the 
appellate court thought that it was not.  Id. 
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A. Solve Problems 
The inquiry into the common sense of a person with ordinary skills is 
subjective, but shifting it to a factual inquiry will better define the 
obviousness analysis.  As a factual inquiry, judges will be provided with 
a process to determine the level of common sense in the relevant fields 
and not have to define it themselves.  They can defer to the experts of 
the fields to provide information and allow juries to make the 
determination as to which expert is more reliable.  Judges are provided 
with a more defined approach to determining the ordinary common 
sense in the field by shifting this to a factual inquiry. 
The shift of determining the ordinary level of common sense in the 
field to a factual inquiry also prevents judges from making this 
determination without the necessary technological background and from 
making their own factual finding to resolve expert testimony.  Judges do 
not have the technical knowledge in the field, so expert testimony is 
mainly needed to determine the level of common sense a person with 
ordinary skill possesses.  By shifting this determination to a factual 
inquiry, judges can defer to experts, which make their lack of 
technological knowledge irrelevant.  Moreover, by allowing juries to 
make the credibility decisions, judges would not be resolving expert 
testimony and infringing on the Seventh Amendment.  Therefore, 
shifting the determination of common sense in the field to a factual 
inquiry prevents judges from making decisions without the technological 
background and from resolving expert testimony. 
Shifting the inquiry to a factual one also allows the Federal Circuit to 
give it the appropriate weight on review and prevent removed credibility 
determinations.  Under de novo review, factual determinations are given 
more deferential treatment.  Thus, the Federal Circuit will be required to 
give more weight to the trial court’s finding of common sense in the 
field.  Such deferential treatment will prevent the court from setting 
aside credibility determinations and making their own removed findings.  
Consequently, shifting the common sense determination to the factual 
inquiries will also prevent the Federal Circuit from making removed 
credibility determinations. 
Additionally, the decisions will remain as uniform as possible because 
obviousness will remain a legal question.  The uncertainty of 
establishing the level of common sense will be removed from the legal 
question.  Judges are bound by stare decisis, so the remaining analysis 
will be uniform.  The final obviousness determination may remain a 
matter of law to provide as much uniformity as possible in the subjective 
analysis. 
23
Murphy: JUDGES ARE ABUSING THEIR AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE OBVIOUSNESS BY AP
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
MURPHY FINAL FORMAT 2 2/22/2011  1:34:29 PM 
372 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
B. Effects on Overall Decision 
The overall outcome of the obviousness analysis will change from 
shifting the common sense determination to a jury because conflicting 
expert testimony would cause a material issue of fact and prevent 
summary judgment.  Because the level of common sense was a question 
of law under obviousness, lower courts were able to determine the 
obviousness question during summary judgment.  The district judge in 
Hitachi resolved the expert testimony and found no issues of material 
fact, thereby allowing him to grant summary judgment to Doll.201  
However, as a factual inquiry, the conflicting expert testimony about 
whether it would be common sense to combine the prior art references 
would be a material issue of fact.  This would prevent the district court 
from granting summary judgment.  A jury might have chosen Hitachi’s 
witnesses to be more credible.  By adding common sense to the factual 
inquiries, the determination would prevent summary judgment and 
possibly change the outcome of the case by allowing a jury to choose a 
different expert witness to be more credible. 
Also, the determination of common sense would not be easily 
reversed on appeal because it would be given more deferential 
treatment.  As shown in Andersen, the Federal Circuit easily reversed 
the districts court’s determination that common sense would cause an 
insect screen designer to use TWP mesh.202  On the other hand, if it 
were a factual inquiry, more weight would have to be afforded to the 
lower court’s findings.  The Federal Circuit could not have so easily 
overturned the common sense determination.  This may cause appellate 
courts to more readily affirm the decisions of their district courts.  
Therefore, decisions of obviousness would be affected by shifting the 
level of common sense decision to the jury on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lower courts have applied the KSR decision to broaden the 
determination of obviousness without changing the legal standard of 
review.  The inclusion of common sense in the field made the 
obviousness analysis difficult to apply and more subjective.  It also 
created another problem for judges in making the obviousness 
determination in that they do not possess the required technical 
background in each pertinent art.  Therefore, the broader obviousness 
analysis forced judges to go beyond interpreting documents and, instead, 
 201. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 202. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 896–98. 
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to heavily rely on expert testimony.  This required judges to resolve 
conflicts, which infringed on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial.  Therefore, the determination of the level of common sense of a 
person with ordinary skill in the art should be shifted to the underlying 
factual inquiries in the obviousness analysis. 
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